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ABSTRACT. Monetary policy on real estate investment in China has had varying impacts across the 
country due to regional differences. A supply-determined model is used to measure the policy effects 
on property investment volume based on a set of regional data from 2003 to 2010. This research yields 
several important findings contributing to an understanding of uneven policy effects on the unbalanced 
regional markets. Firstly, it is revealed that the eastern coastal provinces in China have a higher 
dependence on bank loans for housing investment than that of the other inland provinces. Secondly, 
this research has disentangled the specific transmission channels of monetary policy in the property 
market. Bank loan supply, instead of interest rates, would be a potentially effective policy tool for the 
government in making property market adjustment. Thirdly, the eastern coastal provinces are more 
sensitive in their responses to the changes of monetary stances than the other non-coastal central and 
western provinces. Therefore, the government must take note of the significant heterogeneity arising 
from the regional differences in estimating the policy impacts, although monetary policy is uniformly 
employed in the nation most of the time.
KEYWORDS: Monetary policy; Transmission channels; Real estate investment; Unbalanced regional 
markets; Uneven policy effects
1. INTRODUCTION
Through 30 years of successive reforms, China’s 
real estate industry has made remarkable achieve-
ments, constituting a prominent sector in the 
national economy. The emergence of a booming 
property market is attributable to a fundamental 
institutional transformation from a long-standing 
welfare housing allocation system to a ‘more mar-
ket-oriented’ mechanism. The property market 
from 1998 onwards has entered into the “full mar-
ketization” stage. In the marketization process, 
commercial developers, rather than state organs, 
have been taking a dominant role in housing in-
vestment and production.
After the series of housing reforms, a “prop-
erty bonanza” is observed in the national market, 
which has attracted an excessive growth of real 
estate investment. Leveraging on bank loans to 
carry out investment is the conventional “alchemy 
of real estate” for developers. The supply of bank 
loan underpins property investment in different 
development stages, namely land acquisition, pro-
ject development and the subsequent take-up of 
properties by mortgagors (Zhang 2010). However, 
interest rates in China are highly regulated and 
they appear “cheap”, since they are far below the 
returns on capital (Fukumoto, Muto 2012). There-
fore, using the low-cost working capitals from bank 
loans, developers could comfortably reap the ex-
traordinary high returns from real estate devel-
opment. The situation was exacerbated by banks’ 
predisposition to real estate lending, which fuelled 
real estate over-investment. 
During the periods of 2004–2007 and 2009–
2010, the huge investment especially in real estate 
led to some serious symptoms, such as, an upswing 
price, an extremely high sale turnover, and a surge 
in the volume of new construction (e.g. McKay 
2011). Responding to the overheated property mar-
ket, the Chinese government tightened the mone-
tary policy markedly. It discouraged credit from be-
ing invested in real estate by implementing credit * Corresponding author. E–mail: weiyigang@gmail.com
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rationing. Credit rationing generally refers to the 
circumstance when there is an overwhelming cred-
it demand relative to non-price restricted supply at 
the current loan rates. Tightening of credit condi-
tions was effected through macro-monetary policy 
and specific lending regulations on the real estate 
industry. The chronology of detailed regulations 
pertaining to increasingly stringent lending crite-
ria for development loans is shown in Figure 1 and 
the exact titles of those regulations are tabulated 
in Appendix 1. 
Against this background, this research inves-
tigates the impacts of monetary policy on real es-
tate investment in China. The focus is to demon-
strate the uneven effects brought about by China’s 
monetary policy on the real estate markets of the 
coastal eastern regions and the inland regions. 
Three hypotheses are examined in turn during the 
research process, as follows:
Firstly, given the different rates of development 
in a vast country such as China, one may naturally 
ask if there is any regional difference in terms of 
developers’ reliance on bank credit. The finding 
will be instrumental in understanding the regional 
sensitivity to policy shocks in the market. From 
this perspective, the first hypothesis is postulated 
for testing as follows: 
Hypothesis One: Developers in the eastern 
coastal provinces are less dependent on bank 
credit to underpin their investment activities than 
their counterparts in the inland central and west-
ern provinces. 
The premises of this hypothesis is that, since 
most of the developed real estate markets are situ-
ated in the affluent coastal eastern regions where 
the financial market is better developed and hence 
access to various types of non-bank financing is 
easier, developers should be less dependent on 
bank credit. 
The second issue of this study stems from 
Blinder (1987: 327), who posed the question of 
“how and why does monetary policy affect real eco-
nomic activity?” As for the real estate sector, there 
are uncertainties about the transmission channels 
of monetary policy due to a scarcity of literature on 
this issue to-date. This research seeks to analyze 
the impacts of monetary policy on developers, and 
disentangle the mixed perceptions on the cost-of-
capital effect and the credit supply effect. To carry 
out this analysis, another hypothesis is postulated 
for testing:
Hypothesis Two: The monetary policy exerting 
its effects on real estate is transmitted through 
both “the credit channel” and “the interest rate 
channel”. The monetary policies and their impacts 
will be expounded. 
Following on the last two hypotheses, this re-
search continues to find out the regional difference 
in the developers’ response to the macro-monetary 
policies applied nation-wide. The third hypothesis 
is postulated as below: 
Hypothesis Three: The magnitudes of develop-
ment activities in the eastern coastal region of 
China are responding less significantly to mon-
etary policies than those in the inland central and 
western regions. 
Following this introduction, Section 2 provides 
a retrospective review of the monetary policy in 
China. Section 3 is a discussion of the causes and 
conditions of regional differences of the real estate 
market. Section 4 expounds on the theory of trans-
mission channel of monetary policy. Sections 5 and 
6 present the methods and the research findings 
respectively. Section 7 is a summary of the study, 
together with the conclusions and areas for the fu-
ture policy research.
2. TIGHTENED MACRO-POLICY 
China’ real estate market is widely recognized as a 
bank loan dependent industry. Commercial banks 
in China are primarily state-owned and state-held 
(Xu, Chen 2012). Therefore, the real estate market 
is highly subjective to the centralized monetary 
policy (Xu, Chen 2012). With a widely held belief 
that the real estate market is liquidity-driven, the 
state government implemented tight monetary 
measures with the aim to cool down the overheated 
market (Yiu, Xu 2012). Tight credit periods refer to 
episodes of “relatively high interest rates as well 
as periods of reduced availability of loans due to 
stricter non-price credit rationing” (Owens, Schreft 
1995: 63). Hence, both investment and consumption 
are discouraged. The macroeconomic ramifications 
of “tight credit” are depicted as the shaded peri-
ods in Figure 1. The required reserve ratios and 
the central bank benchmarked lending rates are 
used as proxies of the stance of monetary policy 
(Ashcraft 2006). Both these two variables move 
in tandem. The shaded areas (Sept 2003 to Nov 
2008; Dec 2009 to present) represent the “policy 
windows”, indicating that the monetary authori-
ties implemented tight monetary policies. A care-
ful review on the historical movement of reserve 
ratios and lending rates gives a clear picture that 
China’s monetary policy has gone through persis-
tently “tight episodes”, despite the relatively short 
period of reversal of “easy credit” in 2009 (Fig. 1).
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In the tight periods, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC), which is the national central bank, ad-
justed the required reserve ratio upward in 20 
occasions from 6% in November 1999 to 17.5% in 
June 2008, and continually tightened the reserve 
requirement rate 10 times sequentially from 15% 
to a record high of 21% in June 2011. Besides the 
financial measures, the state government tends to 
administratively intervene the property market 
by releasing ad hoc comments to the market, the 
so-called “window guidance”. The “window guid-
ance”, including the specific directives and policies 
for monetary control targeting at the real estate 
industry of China, is marked up in Figure 1, and 
the detailed contents are presented in Appendix 1. 
The “window guidance” measures restricted devel-
opers’ eligibility to borrow from banks and stipu-
lated stringent monitoring requirements on the 
use of credit. For example, the minimum equity 
to investment ratio for developers was increased 
to 30%. According to the guidelines, bank loans 
for land acquisition should not exceed 70% of the 
land value; the period for loan repayment should 
not be longer than two years; and the loans ex-
tended for construction cash flow purposes should 
not be diverted to real estate development. New 
regulations against credit allocation to property 
developers were emphatically promulgated. For ex-
ample, state banks were prohibited from providing 
overseas real estate developers with initial funds 
(or downpayment) for land purchases. Banks were 
ordered to withdraw overdue loans and to sharply 
curtail future loans for luxury housing, hotels, and 
office blocks.
However, these “harsh” monetary measures did 
not halt the overheated market. Housing prices 
kept surging despite the rise of interest rates and 
tightening of property credit. Compared with the 
modest increase of CPI which grew by only 11.69% 
from 1997 to 2007, housing prices experienced a 
52.57% upswing on a national level and over 100% 
in most developed cities (Xu, Chen 2012). Against 
this background, it is important to investigate the 
effects of monetary policy on the regional real es-
tate market and expound its transmission mecha-
nisms as well.
3. REGIONAL DIFFERENCES
From the literature, it can be seen that there is 
a large regional difference of the real estate mar-
ket in China which may lead to substantial vari-
ations in housing policy implementation (e.g. Yiu, 
Xu 2012). China is conventionally defined as hav-
ing three economic regions, namely the Eastern 
region, the Central Region, and the Western re-
gion. Prioritization of economic development is 
the principal driving factor behind the regional 
differences. Since the opening-up reform in late 
1970s, China has been following an export-orient-
ed strategy for economic development (Wang 2010). 
The ports of the eastern coastal regions have the 
natural advantages to promote the export econo-
my. With abolition of the former goal of common 
equality, the central government decided to accord 
the coastal eastern regions with higher priorities 
for development (Ma 2002). For example, in April 
1987, China initiated the experimental reforms in 
Fig. 1. Monetary policy and real estate lending control in China (see Appendix 1 for policy codes)  
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transferability and conveyance of land use rights 
for four coastal eastern cities: Shanghai, Guang-
zhou, Shenzhen and Tianjin (Tse et al. 1999). As a 
consequence, the declared goal of “supporting some 
regions to become rich first” has led to significantly 
uneven paces of development (Ma 2002). Nowadays 
the three most important economic zones, “Beijing-
Tianjin-Tangshan Economic Circle”, “The Yangtze 
River Delta Economic Circle”, and “The Pearl River 
Delta Economic Circle” are clustered in the coastal 
eastern regions. Just these three circles, making 
up 20.6% of the total population and 1.1% of the 
nation’s land area, contribute to 85% of the entire 
foreign investment and 75% of import-export vol-
ume (Liu, Meng 2009). In contrast, the inland cen-
tral and western cities are at the bottom of “the 
development ladder”. It was until the 2000s that 
the central authority released a series of stimula-
tory measures to promote coordinated economic de-
velopments between the coastal eastern and other 
less developed provinces. However, the development 
levels across regions are showing rising disparity 
instead of a narrowing gap. For instance, the GDP 
of the eastern region, which housed 27.1% of the 
nation’s total population, accounted for 54.7% of 
the national GDP in 2002. This was in sharp con-
trast with that of the western region, which housed 
22.88% of people but only contributed to 14.4% of 
the nation’s GDP in the same year (National Bu-
reau of Statistics of China 2003). 
Owing to the unbalanced regional economy, re-
markable regional variations in urbanization level 
and the pace of urban housing development con-
tinue to exist (Ma 2002; Yu 2011), together with 
a high regional income inequality, which jointly 
constitute the different fundamentals of real estate 
markets across regions. According to “Notices by 
the People’s Bank of China on further improvements 
on real estate credits business management” imple-
mented in 2003, China stipulated that the property 
credit issued by each district’s commercial banks 
can only be invested in that specific region. This 
regulation prohibited the cross-regional shifts and 
uses of credit since 2003, which increased the dis-
parities of loan provisions in the regional markets. 
These regional variations may create different re-
sponses relative to the monetary policy. 
Apparently, these remarkably different mar-
ket fundmentals can lead to the heterogeneous 
monetary policy effects across regional levels. A 
neglect of the syndrome of regional differences 
among regions might result in a misleading con-
clusion (Yiu, Xu 2012). However, moneteray pol-
icy research regarding China’s real estate mainly 
treats the national market as a whole (Wang, Han 
2009; Huang, Wang 2010). There is still a paucity 
of China’s real estate studies adopting a regional 
perspetive to sufficently evaluate monetary policy 
influence. As such, a knowledge gap exists in Chi-
na, in that a regional dimension is needed for a 
robust and complete study of the monetary policy 
effects on China’s real estate market, which this 
paper fills.
4. TRANSMISSION CHANNEL OF 
MONETARY POLICY 
There are two theories regarding monetary policy 
transmission channels. They differ fundamentally 
over the different modus through which the effects 
of monetary policy occur and are transmitted. For 
the financing factors, Lindbeck (1998) claimed that 
both interest rate and credit availability are the 
centrally important factors which borrowers si-
multaneously take into consideration when they 
decide on their lending. Yet, the often-heard-of 
phrase of “cost and availability of credit” in the 
literature, which “strengthens the impression that 
cost and availability have separable and independ-
ent effects on the decisions to consume or invest” 
(Meltzer 1974: 763). In terms of the relative im-
portance of the two monetary policy instruments, 
scholars hold different views. 
Some scholars support the role of interest rate 
as a policy instrument itself. Lindbeck (1998) 
argued that given the limited supply side of the 
credit market and the special financial structure 
of some firms, the interest rate effects may accen-
tuate. Caballero (1999) claimed that investment 
in general showed extreme sensitivity to the cost 
of capital. Taking a tight monetary policy as an 
example, for both developers and homebuyers, a 
rising lending rate indicates higher costs of bor-
rowing, and thus erodes their willingness for in-
vestment and spending, which in a feedback man-
ner discourages borrowing demands. Meanwhile, 
some research suggests that credit availability 
is crucial to the real estate market (e.g. Meltzer 
1974; PwC 2013). A constrictive policy may drain 
the bank reserve, weaken bank’s lending capabili-
ties and incentives, and thus lessen loan volume. 
The reduced amounts of loans available to develop-
ers and homebuyers would ultimately depress in-
vestment and consumption in the housing market. 
This research attempts to identify the relative im-
portance of the interest rate channel and the credit 
channel through an analysis of empirical evidence 
in mainland China. 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
With an aim to explore the developers’ financ-
ing composition, i.e. the Hypothesis One, as to 
whether developers in the eastern provinces are 
less dependent on bank credit to underpin their 
investment activities than their counterparts in 
the central and western provinces, the standard 
scores (z) and Mann-Whitney test were used to in-
vestigate the regional differences. The calculation 
procedure of the standard score (z) is as follows: 




where: x is a raw score to be standardized, the raw 
score is derived by dividing the bank loan amount 
by the total investment; μ is the mean score of the 
population; σ is the standard deviation of the popu-
lation mean score.
Mann-Whitney test uses a non-parametric sta-
tistic to compare two independent groups of sam-
pled data. To test Hypotheses Two and Three, the 
fixed effect models based on China’s provincial 
panel data were then used to study developers’ 
sensitivity to the monetary policy during the pe-
riod from 2003 to 2010. The estimation equations 
are based on the theme of housing supply model 
(e.g. DiPasquale 1999). 
To determine the equation variables, it is im-
portant to understand the decision-making process 
of developers in the provision of housing supply. 
Based on an extensive literature review, housing 
supply is defined in this paper as a linear function 
of new property prices, long-term lending inter-
est rate, land areas, construction cost, and credit 
availability. Apart from these supply-side factors, 
the estimation models also take into considera-
tion the variables of “floor space waiting for sale” 
(FSWS) and “floor space sold” (FSSD). The cost of 
holding unsold housing on the market is an im-
portant factor affecting developers’ decisions on 
housing investment (Poterba 1984). However, data 
on average house selling time is not available in 
China. Due to the data restriction, FSWS is used 
as a proxy to reflect this holding cost. FSSD was 
selected as a barometer to indicate the effective 
housing demands in the market, which directly af-
fects developers’ incentives of housing production. 
Variables chosen to represent each determinant 
in the investment decisions are shown in Table 1. 
The purpose is to use panel estimation model to in-
vestigate the policy shock of loan supply and lend-
ing rate variations on housing development. Three 
empirical models with different rotations of vari-
ables are developed as Eq. (1), Eq. (2), and Eq. (3). 
In these models, the effects of interest rate and 
bank credits were evaluated with different model 
Table 1. Variable definitions
Variable Definition Abbreviation Expected coefficient
Dependent variable
Actual completed investment by enterprises 
in real estate development (RMB Million)




Domestic loan (RMB Million) Measuring the bank loans available LOAN Positive
Property selling price (RMB/Sq.m.) Measuring the new property prices PSP Positive
Real lending rate (one to three years)1 (%) Measuring the cost of borrowing RLR Negative 
“Dummy 1” for tight episodes
“Dummy 0” for easy episode in 2009
Measuring the effects of policy 
stances
Dummy Negative
Land area to be developed2 (Sq.m.) Measuring the availability of land LATD Positive
Cost of construction (RMB/Sq.m.) Measuring the cost shifters CBC Negative
Floor space waiting for sale (Thousand 
Sq.m.)
Measuring the vacancy of housing 
spaces and costs of holding property 
assets in the market
FSWS Negative
Floor space sold (Thousand Sq.m.) Measuring developers’ expectations 
of market demand
FSSD Positive
1 According to the length of borrowing, the People’s Bank of China PBOC classifies three loan categories: short-term 
loans (less than one year), medium-term (between one and five years), and long-term loans (more than five years). Zhang 
(2010) argues that as the period for a typical real estate project lasts for 3 years, it supports the use of 1~3 year lending 
rate as the variables in the estimation model.
2 The variable of “Land area to be developed” refers to the land banks of developers which have received land use right 
and are waiting for development.
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specifications. More convincing conclusions will be 
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Note: Index i represents provinces, and index t 
refers to period. Variable definitions are provided 
in Table 1. 
The panel data sets cover 31 provinces and mu-
nicipalities. Regarding the model selection between 
fixed and random effects, a series of Hausman 
tests are conducted. In five out of nine estimations, 
test results reject the use of random effects at 1% 
significant level (see Table 4). Fixed-effects models 
are thus considered, facilitating the regional com-
parisons. As a supplementary task, random-effect 
models are also performed. The research findings 
are consistent with the fixed-effect ones, which 
lead to even more pervasive conclusions.
The variables of nominal investment and pric-
es are transformed by the national CPI deflator, 
which takes 1999 as 100, to reflect real property 
price resilience and market activities. All the data 
in this paper is sourced from census publications, 
the China Statistics Yearbooks 2004–2011.
6. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
For each province, the standard scores (Z) of cred-
it-fund ratio (representing the fund sourced from 
domestic loan’ to the total fund possessed by the 
real estate enterprises) are compared to reveal the 
relative importance of bank credit as a source of 
fund for development. A higher Z score indicates 
a higher dependence on bank credit. The results 
rank the relative importance of bank loans to real 
estate financing in different regions in different 
years (see Appendixes 2 and 3). They show the in-
herent concentrations of credit in the coastal east-
ern regions, whilst lagging provinces are mostly 
from the inland western or central regions of Chi-
na and there is no apparent difference between the 
two latter regions. 
Table 2. Mann-Whitney tests between Central and Western regions
 Variables U W Mean rank 
Central/Western 
Corrected for ties two-tailed probability 











































Notes: *** and * respectively denote 1% and 10% significance level.
Table 3. Mann-Whitney tests between coastal Eastern and inland Western and Central regions
Variables U W Mean rank
Eastern/Inland
Corrected for ties two-tailed probability











































Notes: *** and * respectively denote 1% and 10% significance level.
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For a more objective statistical analysis, the 
Mann-Whitney test was used to compare the de-
gree of developers’ reliance on bank credit across 
regions. Table 2 displays the results regarding the 
central and western regions which show that there 
is, in general, no statistically significant difference 
of the reliance on bank credit between these two 
regions. This result once again confirms the previ-
ous Z score findings. Therefore, this research com-
bines these two regions into one group, i.e., the 
inland regions as a whole, in proceeding with the 
following tests. In the next step, this study tests 
the difference between the coastal eastern and in-
land regions. Table 3 shows that the eastern prov-
inces have higher mean ranks than other inland 
provinces. The conclusion that the eastern region 
in general has a more concentrated use of bank 
credit is drawn with high statistical significance 
at 1% level (see Table 3). 
The tests indicate a significant heterogeneity 
across the coastal and inland provinces, in terms of 
their dependence on bank credit financing. Accord-
ingly, Hypothesis One is rejected. On the contrary, 
there is an unexpected finding suggesting that the 
coastal eastern provinces are more reliant on bank 
loans than the inland region, despite the more de-
veloped financial system operating in the former. 
Particularly, some Tier 1 and 2 cities, such as Bei-
jing, Tianjin and Shanghai, were mostly dependent 
on the banking system to sustain their investment 
activities (see Appendixes 2 and 3). The larger size 
of the property market and hence greater demand 
for finance may be key explanations for the higher 
reliance on bank financing in the eastern region. 
Due to the heavier reliance on the loan market, a 
higher sensitivity to policy shocks is expected. 
To test Hypotheses Two and Three, three panel 
estimation models (Eqs (1), (2) and (3)) were run 
respectively with the panel data of the national 
aggregate, the eastern market, and the inland 
markets. Table 4 depicts the results for different 
estimation specifications. The long-term lending 
rate is considered as a cost for the working capi-
tal. Loan is an important component affecting the 
ability of developers in property development and 
acquisition. Dummy variables, representing the 
credit rationing, are included in Models 1 and 2. 
Except for the variables of interest rate, dum-
my, floor space waiting for sale (FSWS), and cost 
of building, the estimation results in the predicted 
signs across the three models in both the east-
ern and inland regions as well as on the national 
level. All the other variables, including property 
price, loans, construction cost, land supply, floor 
space waiting for sale, and floor space sold (FSSD), 
have a positive relation with property investment. 
The findings support the conventional view that 
house construction is elastic to price in the long 
run (Blackley 1999), because property price deter-
mines the profitability of housing productions. The 
unexpected sign of building cost, positive rather 
than negative, is a reasonable finding in China’s 
current booming market, in view of the easy cost 
transferability to property purchasers in the wake 
of escalating property prices in China. The cost 
of holding unsold housing, represented by FSWS, 
also indicates a positive relation with investment. 
This finding can be understood from two aspects. 
On one hand, in such a booming market, the vol-
ume of unsold housing remains at a low level and 
the related holding cost would not lead to a seri-
ous cash flow problem for developers. On the other 
hand, increases in vacant floors (FSWS) resulting 
from booming investment show positive expecta-
tions about the housing price growth. This optimis-
tic psychology widely perceived by developers will 
further encourage their housing investment. Floor 
space sold (FSSD) show statistically significant 
(at 1% confidence level) and positive signs. This 
evidence shows that the volume of housing sales 
is an important consideration developers take into 
account when making future investment decisions. 
The interest rate variables exhibit statistically 
significant and positive signs in the inland regions 
and also at the national level. The unexpected 
positive signs contradict the conventional views 
that rising interest rates dampen investment and 
spending, and vice versa (e.g. Poterba 1984). Re-
ferring to the positive signs in this research, the 
increase of interest rate cannot constrict the over-
heated investment but generate a reverse effect. 
Although a substantial body of literature for real 
estate debacles has identified low interest rate 
as the causal factor, China is obviously having a 
different situation. The findings reveal that the 
monetary policy of raising interest rates fuels the 
overheated real estate market in China. 
Reasons for the anomaly in the expected effects 
of interest rates are complicated, with no single 
satisfactory theory. Some real estate researchers 
have proposed several reasons for the apparent 
contradiction. Firstly, referring to the convention-
al cost of capital view, the shifts of interest rate 
can affect developers’ investment decisions in two 
ways: (1) the cost of borrowing can be more than 
compensated for by the return of capital; and (2) 
there is a change in expectations on future re-
turns (Giuliodori 2005). The increase of interest 
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rate will raise the expected return (discounting 
rate) on investment. Incidentally, interest rate of-
ten increases with the rise of CPI. In combination, 
the increased return rate and inflation hedging 
effects attract more capitals inflows to the real es-
tate industry. Therefore, investment activities are 
not compressed but instead unexpectedly driven 
higher. Secondly, from another perspective, the 
rises in interest rates narrow the profitable invest-
ment potentials in the real economy, such as the 
manufacturing industry. Hence, capital in search 
of new lucrative investment opportunities will be 
redirected into the real estate industry, given the 
sustainable and swift run-ups in property prices 
in the last two decades. The situation in China fits 
the views of Livingston (2009: 47) that “a new tidal 
wave of surplus capital with no place to go except 
into real estate”, as experienced by some developed 
economies (such as Hong Kong) during the recent 
mortgage meltdown originated in the U.S. Third-
ly, rising capital costs can be easily transferred 
to housing purchasers in a booming market. Last 
but not least, expectations generated by an inter-
est rate policy may lead to effects contradictory 
to the policy intentions. Using two psychologists 
Tversky and Kahneman’s heuristics theory (1974), 
Wang (2010) explains how market expectation can 
give rise to games (conflict/inconsistency) between 
policy and investors. In respect of China’s real es-
tate market, given that there are already series 
of “harsh” rules, it is widely conjectured that the 
central authorities do worry about the tremendous 
damage to the national economy resulting from a 
potential real estate crash. Knowing that the gov-
ernment was facing a dilemma between real estate 
and national economy, developers widely hold the 
belief that any poor performance of the economy 
will cause an easing of current tight policy con-
trol on the property market. This means a tight 
policy may eventually lead to perverse changes 
in the expectation among the public (PwC 2013). 
Consistent hikes in interest rates suggest a signal 
to developers in that the tight leash on the real 
estate market may ease in the near future when a 
turning point would be reached to drive economic 
growth again. Therefore, these expectation effects 
add to the difficulties of using interest rate tools 
to combat the overheated housing investment. 
Table 4. Estimates of housing supply
Dependent variable: real property investment (RMB millions)
Variables National Coastal Eastern Inland Central & Western



















































































































































24.872*** 48.004*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.262 27.146*** 20.748*** 34.285***
Adj.R2 0.988 0.982 0.986 0.982 0.978 0.981 0.988 0.953 0.985
DW 1.384 1.131 1.546 1.503 1.511 1.807 1.422 1.106 1.521
SSR) 3.500 5.086 4.959 0.963 1.31 1.345 1.944 2.644 3.095
SER 0.139 0.167 0.153 0.120 0.129 0.131 0.135 0.157 0.156
Notes: ***,**, and * respectively denote 1% , 5%, and 10% significance level.
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Referring to the result of testing Hypothesis Two, 
it is inferred that the “interest rate channel” is not 
operative in China’s real estate market.
The dummy viable representing credit condi-
tion from 2003 to 2010 is only significant in the 
eastern region. Credit condition is centrally im-
portant for developers’ access to bank loans. For 
instance, the stance of monetary policy often gets 
tight when the economy is overheated, which in-
creases the difficulties for developers to finance 
their ongoing projects, given the booming demand 
for housing in the market. In general, the weak 
explanatory power of the dummy variable is due 
to the irresponsive attitudes of banks in their re-
action to the central authority’s directives. Banks’ 
predispositions to real estate lending contradict 
the macro policy. There are positive rather than 
negative coefficients in the eastern regions. The 
findings reveal that developers in the market can 
maintain “exuberance access” to bank loans during 
2003 to 2010, despite of the backdrop of tightening 
macro-monetary policy.
Housing builders are assumed to be the most 
affected when loan availability is tightened (Po-
terba 1984). The results show that property in-
vestment is positively and significantly related to 
credit supply. The testing results also reveal that 
the monetary effects are mainly dominated by loan 
availability rather than interest rates, when the 
coefficients are compared. In addition, the magni-
tudes of investment responses to loan changes are 
considerably different in the eastern region than 
on the national and inland levels. The coefficients 
of the loan variable of eastern region ranged from 
0.4 to 0.64, indicating roughly 2 to 4 times of the 
inland levels. This finding reveals that the east-
ern region was affected more by the credit supply 
and monetary policy stances. Triangulated with 
findings from the Mann-Whitney test, the higher 
sensitivity can be safely explained by the higher 
reliance on bank loans. In general, the research 
findings reject Hypotheses Two and Three. Only 
“the credit channel” is functioning in the market, 
which helps to fulfill the goal of monetary policy. 
And the eastern coastal regions are more sensitive 
in terms of responses to monetary policy changes 
than the other inland regions. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyzes the regional difference in the 
credit dependence of real estate investment. By 
using panel data analysis, the impacts of credit 
channel and money channel on the real estate de-
velopment market have been investigated. There 
are four important findings: First, the tests indi-
cate a significant heterogeneity across the differ-
ent provinces, i.e., in general the more developed 
the real estate market is, the more dependent its 
investment is on bank lending. It is expected that 
the impacts of policy shocks are stronger on these 
cities. Second, an increase of interest rate seems 
to have positive effects in stimulating investments 
rather than exert a depressing influence as would 
be expected. The research outcomes demonstrate 
the dysfunction of monetary policy operation 
through interest rate tools. It can be expected that 
if the high interest rates persist, massive capital 
will continue to flood into the real estate market to 
seek for extraordinary returns. Third, shifts of real 
estate lending can positively affect property invest-
ment, which infers that control of banks’ lending 
activities can be a potentially effective approach to 
subdue real estate over-investment. Rising interest 
rate and rapid expansion of credit are attributable 
for the unbridled real estate investment expansion. 
It is important for the government to investigate 
how to improve the efficacy of policy enforcement 
and the implementations of credit rationings by 
the commercial banks. Fourth, although the mon-
etary policy is uniformly employed across the coun-
try, the remarkable difference in the magnitudes 
of responses to policy shocks is a good reminder for 
the government to shift its concerns from national 
to local levels. Scholars and policy-makers should 
be fully aware of the potential heterogeneous ef-
fects of monetary policy on its implementation over 
different regions. This study has not investigated 
the dynamic response to policy shocks. This limita-
tion may be addressed in future research by means 
of high-frequency data.
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APPENDIX 1
Overview of the credit control policies on the real estate industry from 2003–2010 in China
Date Bureau Policies 
I Jun 
2003




State Council “Directives to improve the health and sustained development of the real estate 
industry” – The so-called “18 directives”.
III Sep 
2004




State Council “Directive to stabilize the housing price” – The so-called “Jiuguobatiao”.
V May 
2005
MOHURD “Directives to stabilize the housing price” – The so-called “Xinguobatiao”.
VI Aug 
2005
CBRC “Directive to improve the risk management of trusts investment”.
VII May 
2006
MOHURD, etc. “Directive to stabilize the housing supply structure” – The so-called “Guoliutiao”.
VIII Sep
2007
PBOC “China Banking Regulatory Commission’s directive to improve management of 
the commercial real estate credit”.
IX Jul 
2008












CBRC “Directives to further improve credit management”.
XIII Jan 
2010




CBRC “Interim measures for the administration of working capital loans”.
XV Apr 
2010
“Premier Wen Jiabao presided the executive meeting to formulate measures in-




State Council “Directives of the State Council to control the increase of housing price in some 
cities” – The so-called “Xinguoshitiao”.
Note: PBOC represents the People’s Bank of China; CBRC represents China Banking Regulatory Commission; MOHURD 
represents the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development; NDRC represents National Development and Reform 
Commission.
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APPENDIX 2
The Z scores of credit relative to real estate enterprises’ total fund in different regions in 2010
The description and classification of China’s regional real estate market
Eastern Z scores Central Z scores Western Z scores
Tianjin 2.611 Hubei 0.524 Qinghai 0.955
Shanghai 1.54 Hunan 0.061 Chongqing 0.788
Beijing 1.46 Jiangxi –0.117 Gansu 0.387
Guangdong 0.982 Anhui –0.602 Guizhou 0.307
Jiangsu 0.55 Shanxi –0.64 Ningxia 0.05
Zhejiang 0.532 Henan –0.821 Sichuan –0.215
Shandong 0.254 Jilin –1.246 Shaanxi –0.383
Hainan 0.245 Heilongjiang –1.622 Xinjiang –0.392
Fujian 0.175 Inner Mongolia –1.732 Yunnan –0.446




The Z scores of credit relative to real estate enterprises’ total fund in different regions in 2003
The description and classification of China’s regional real estate market
Eastern Z scores Central Z scores Western Z scores
Beijing 2.118 Shanxi 0.421 Shaanxi 1.529
Zhejiang 1.518 Hunan 0.195 Yunnan 0.994
Tianjin 1.474 Hubei 0.139 Ningxia 0.569
Jiangsu 1.151 Anhui –0.471 Gansu 0.462
Liaoning 0.559 Henan –0.569 Chongqing 0.269
Guangxi 0.419 Jiangxi –0.574 Guizhou –0.291
Guangdong 0.174 Heilongjiang –1.043 Tebit –0.333
Shanghai 0.134 Jilin –1.807 Sichuan –0.478
Shandong –0.257 Inner Mongolia –2.354 Xinjiang –0.531
Fujian –0.409 Qinghai –0.621
Hainan –1.02
Hebei –1.366
